Table of Contents:
  • Madison's theory of representation / Bruce E. Cain and W.T. Jones
  • Publius and public choice / Thomas Schwartz
  • Electoral institutions in The Federalist Papers: a contemporary perspective / Henry W. Chappell, Jr. and William R. Keech
  • Restraining the whims and passions of the public / Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro
  • The constitution as an optimal social contract: a transaction cost analysis of The Federalist Papers / Donald Wittman
  • Stability and efficiency in a separation-of-powers constitutional system / Gary J. Miller and Thomas H. Hammond
  • Why a constitution? / Russell Hardin
  • Are the two houses of Congress really coequal? / Steven J. Brams
  • Assessing the power of the Supreme Court / John. R. Chamberlin
  • Checks, balances, and bureaucratic usurpation of congressional power / Thomas Schwartz
  • The distribution of power in the federal government: perspectives from The Federalist Papers-a critique / Mark P. Petracca
  • Public choice analysis and the ratification of the Constitution / Robert A. McGuire and Robert. L. Ohsfeldt
  • Constitutional conflict in state and nation / Cheryl L. Eavey and Gary J. Miller
  • The strategy of ratification / Evelyn C. Fink and William H. Riker.