Analyticity /
Main Author: | |
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Other Authors: | |
Format: | Book |
Language: | English |
Published: |
London ; New York :
Routledge,
2009.
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Series: | New problems of philosophy series
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=290314 |
Table of Contents:
- Conceptions of analytic truth
- Hume's fork
- Kant and the analytic-synthetic distinction
- Synthetic a priori propositions
- Bolzano and analyticity
- Analyticity in Frege
- Russell's paradox and the theory of descriptions
- The Vienna circle
- Carnap and logical empiricism
- Carnap and Quine
- Demise of the aufbau
- Philosophy as logical syntax
- Logical and descriptive languages
- Physical languages
- Analyticity in syntax
- Carnap's move to semantics
- Explications
- Analyticity in a semantic setting
- Eliminating metaphysics : Carnap's final try
- W.V. Quine : explication is elimination
- Behaviorists ex officio
- Analyticity in the crosshairs
- Analyticity and its discontents
- Questioning analyticity
- Quine's two dogmas of empiricism
- Objections to the intelligibility of analytic
- Quine's coherence arguments : Carnap's reply
- Other responses to the coherence objection : Grice and Strawson on Quine
- A second dogma of empiricism
- Responses to the existence objections to analyticity
- Analyticity by convention
- Quine's developed attitude toward analyticity
- Analyticity and ontology
- Quine's naturalized ontology
- The indeterminacy of translation
- Some consequences of the indeterminacy arguments : ontological relativity and analyticity
- Responses to Quine's indeterminacy arguments
- Carnap's empiricism, semantics, and ontology
- Some Quinean and other responses to empiricism, semantics, and ontology
- Some recent connections between conceptual truths and ontology
- Quine's criterion of ontological commitment, causality, and exists
- Eli Hirsch and Ted Sider on mereological principles
- The Canberra Project : a resurrection of Carnap's aufbau
- Analyticity and epistemology
- Analytic truths and their role in epistemology : the classical position
- Objecting to the classical position
- Bonjour on moderate empiricism
- Quine's epistemology naturalized
- Quine and evidence : responses to circularity
- Kripke on apriority, analyticity, and necessity
- Analyticity repositioned
- The best cases : stipulations and mathematics
- One type of statement that might be reasonably called analytic
- Aside on two dimensionalism
- Analyticity and T-analyticity
- How analyticity avoids many common objections to analyticity
- Some brief comments on two other approaches to analyticity
- Mathematical claims as T-analytic
- A further potential application : pure and impure stipulata.